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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ This paper explores the relevance of householders' security of tenure to their 19 willingness to pay the capital and operational costs for sanitation in low-income 20 urban areas. When the sanitation norm is self-managed on-site systems, as is the 21 case in many low-income areas of towns and cities, household investment 22 decisions in sanitation are inherently linked to tenure security. Based on 23 evidence gathered in Dakar, Senegal, it is de facto rather than de jure tenure 24 rights that provide sufficient security for household investment in sanitation. We 25 make a critical distinction between willingness to invest and willingness to pay for 26 the capital investment costs and on-going operational servicing costs of 27 sanitation. Whilst tenants and those with lower tenure security do not invest in 28 capital infrastructure, they are willing to pay for the operational aspects of 29 sanitation services. Current formal policy settings and strategies for urban 30 sanitation tend not to cater for this group; this is a fundamental oversight as 31 these constitute significant and growing segments of the population. Land tenure 32 and sanitation issues need to be considered in an integrated way and the capital 33 and operational costs need to be disaggregated in planning to respond more 34 effectively to the spending decisions of the urban poor. issues and sanitation and to what extent they affect investment in on-site 53 sanitation systems (that is, systems in which the disposal of excreta takes place 54 on or near the housing plot in the absence of networked sewerage; pit latrines 55 and septic tanks fall into this category). Throughout the paper an important 56 distinction is drawn between: capital investment costs that are incurred through 57 constructing a new latrine or otherwise improving the quality of a sanitation 58 asset by upgrading; and operating costs which are paid to service the facility, for 59 emptying the pit or tank and subsequent transport and disposal of the contents. 60 61
To achieve citywide sanitation, understanding the dynamics of tenure i.e. how 62 residents obtain and keep land and housing, and invest in infrastructure is 63 critical. Furthermore, the paper argues that failing to take these dynamics into 64 account results in inappropriate sanitation strategies for a significant, and Structural changes or improvements were made by 183 households to their 382 sanitation infrastructure. The primary reason for modification was found to be 383 essential repair when the facility showed signs of severe defects that prevented 384 continued use, most often relating to pit collapse (Table 4 ). The distribution of 385 the repairs was found to be more heavily concentrated in the informal and 386 spontaneously occupied zones that are flood-prone. 387 388 These nuances become clearly illustrated in the case of absent landlords. Tenants 455 and landlords surveyed agreed that structural changes to the dwelling (including 456 sanitation) are the landlord's responsibility. The onus of responsibility of 457 sanitation service provision often falls to the landlord although there is little 458 incentive or enforceable legal framework to incite them to adopt this role 459 (Schaub-Jones, 2009). For landlords, a private toilet facility has little effect on the 460 potential rental turnover (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008) . Tenants are averse to 461 investment as they are not able to reap the benefits of any long-term investment 462 (Gilbert, 2003 This is a disconnection between strategy and the reality of urbanization where 483 significant and growing segments of the population lack tenure security. 484
The vast majority of the sanitation services for residents of low-income areas are 485 provided by small-scale independent providers. This presents a complex 486 challenge to utilities and municipal governments who are organized 487 conventionally to manage utility-based service provision such as sewerage. On 488 the other hand, on-site systems served by independent service providers 489 interface with households in a very different way via a demand-responsive pay-490 as-you-go service. Whilst utilities cite barriers preventing their operation and 491 service in informal areas, independent providers not only overcome these 492 barriers but thrive due to their flexibility and their responsiveness to demand 493 (Collignon & Vézina, 2000) . Moreover, as the findings of this study have shown, 494 households can engage with the latter regardless of where they live, whether 495 they are a landlord or a tenant, and their level of tenure security. Operational 496 sanitation services are tenure neutral. 497 498
This suggests that for populations where tenure insecurity is acting as a 499 disincentive to household investment, the focus of sanitation developments 500 needs to change. There is a need for more broadly based sanitation service 501 provision, including non-networked systems and a greater emphasis on 502 operational activities rather than solely investment in physical infrastructure. 503 504
Government has a pivotal role in creating and enforcing an enabling and 505 regulatory environment for operational sanitation activities. This research has 506 found that whilst there may be vast segments of urban populations who are 507 unwilling to invest the capital costs, they are willing to pay for the operational 508 costs of sanitation services. A concrete recommendation is to use this finding to 509 segment the population. For those who are willing to pay for operational services 510 rather than capital investment, feasible mechanisms towards citywide sanitation 511 are to support the operational activities of collection, transport and safe disposal 512 of the faecal sludge. These activities provide a tenure-neutral mechanism for 513 municipal service provision to find interfaces with residents of informal areas -514 without encountering compromising situations of consolidating state 515 infrastructure in informal settlements. In short, citywide sanitation strategies 516 need to respond in a way that accounts for the investment logic of residents. 517 518 Conclusions 519
The study has found that de facto tenure security is a sufficient but necessary 520 precondition for household capital investment in sanitation. Equally important is 521 the finding that tenants and those lacking tenure security, whilst they are 522 unlikely to be willing to invest in the capital cost of latrines, do pay substantial 523 fees to service providers for operational sanitation services such as the emptying 524 of full pits and tanks and the removal and disposal of their contents. These 525 operational investments are not accounted for in formal policy settings. Tenure 526 status is associated with a much greater disparity in the level of service for 527 sanitation than it is for either water supply or electricity. 528 529
Few urban sanitation strategies make this important distinction between 530 willingness to pay for operational as opposed to capital costs to cater for those 531 who are unwilling or unable to invest. This is a fundamental oversight in current 532 sanitation strategies for the population segments who cannot invest, thus failing 533 to provide a sanitation strategy for all. This is of growing concern given the type 534 of urbanization being witnessed in developing countries which is characterized 535 by increasing concentrations of low income populations and tenants. Urban 536 sanitation strategies therefore need to distinguish between willingness to invest, 537 willingness to pay and ability to pay. Those who are unwilling to invest in capital 538 costs may be willing to pay for operational costs of sanitation services. 539 540
The effect of tenure issues on household sanitation decisions in turn implies that 541 there is a need for a broader sanitation service provision, including non-542 networked systems and a greater emphasis on supporting downstream activities 543 associated with faecal sludge management. Currently few interfaces actually 544 connect the city with the majority of the population, especially the poor. 545 Sanitation provision happens largely under the radar of formal city planning and 546 urban management via multiple formal or informal service providers. Policy and 547 strategic planning for sanitation needs to embrace the issues of operational costs 548 and tenure security and be integrated into wider city development strategies in 549 cities such as Dakar. -. There is need for including factors that influence the frequency of emptying septic tanks/ operational costs in parts of Dakar e.g.: -About 95 percent of the population has good access to water (76 percent to piped water, 19 percent to community stand-pipes, and only 5 percent through vendors or wells).
-The frequent and severe flooding in many of the poorest districts of Pikene and Rafisque.
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Lines 257-261 4. The Study location: The statement "Dakar, Senegal was chosen as the location for the research due to its rapid urbanisation rate, the existence of high density habitats and its innovative approaches to both urban sanitation and tenure regularisation policies" is not substantiated by some description of the innovative approaches to urban sanitation and tenure regularisation.
The new para referred to above (Lines 234-248) highlight the innovative approaches adopted by the government agencies 5. Language -Frequent use of the term 'urban' in a sentence is not required/ distracting e.g. page 2
The use of the term "urban" has been edited out other than where it is essential in order to retain the sense of Scott Habitat paper table of review comments and changes.docx the narrative -When the sanitation norm is self-managed on-site systems, as is the case in many low-income areas of (???) towns and cities, household investment decisions in sanitation are inherently linked to tenure security Done: Line 22 (thank you for spotting this) -To achieve citywide sanitation, understanding the dynamics of tenure i.e. how residents obtain and keep land and housing, and invest in infrastructure is critical. Furthermore, the paper argues that failing to take these dynamics into account results in inappropriate urban sanitation strategies for a significant, and growing segment of the urban population of cities in low and middle-income countries.
Lines 65-66 redrafted -At one end of the spectrum there are self-help landlords who share similar socio-economic characteristics as the tenants. On the other hand, there is also a form of exploitative and absentee landlordism that has earned rental a poor reputation (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008 ).
Lines 138-140 redrafted -There is a significant variance in ability, will and freedom of the urban residents to modify their infrastructure .. 
Reviewer 2 Action Taken
Results: Table 1 should be part of the Result and not the Method. Again the statistics in Table 1 are not clear enough as the total percentage figures exceed 100%. And yet the impression given is that the sample size (100%) was segregated into the TENURE echelons (status or levels) in the study area. Also figures 1 and 2 are repeated. Nevertheless, the results are logically well explained. 
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